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Over the  last several decades a number of economists, particularly in  
North America, have questioned the  extent of government regulation and 
intervention in many economic sectors, claiming that the  government 
often has gone f a r  beyond what is necessary to  protect the public and in 
the process seriously impaired efficiency. These concerns have actually 
stimulated significant reforms in certain countries, as the  recent dere- 
gulation of the airline and banking industries in the  United States illus- 
trates. 
In this study, Stephen Dresch moves further down this path by argu- 
ing tha t  the  government should leave to  the  private sector the stockpil- 
ing of strategic materials needed in the  event of war. He contends that  
the  private sector will be more efficient a t  this activity, and more likely 
to accumulate the  optimal level of stacks. In addition, he suggests tha t  
reliance on private stockpiling may actually reduce the likelihood of war. 
These conclusions, a s  the analysis makes clear, depend on a number 
of assumptions, whose validity many will want t o  question. But then, the 
purpose of a working paper is to stimulate discussion and debate, and 
thereby help the author and others understand their differences and 
clarify their own thinking. 
John E. Tilton 
Research Leader 
Mineral Trade and 
Markets Project 
PREFACE 
This paper draws upon and extends certain facets of an earlier study 
undertaken for the U.S. Federal Preparedness Agency [ P A ]  (now the 
Federal Emergency Management Administration [FEMA]).* However, 
while the prior study was concerned primarily with policy recommenda- 
tions which would result in greater economic efficiency in stockpile 
activities and only ancillarily addressed the issue of the underlying jus- 
tification for any governmental initiatives in this domain, the present 
paper is explicitly addressed to this more fundamental issue. 
A t  the outset i must admit that the paper may be viewed primarily as 
performing a heuristic function. While its critique of U.S. strategic 
stockpile policy, and especially the conclusion that  levels of inventories 
which would be accumulated by private speculators operating through 
competitive markets would be a t  least as socially optimal as those inven- 
tories which would be accumulated by a public agency, is intended seri- 
ously, the required institutional stipulations and related analytical 
assumptions (e.g., that speculators do not anticipate price controls, 
rationing and/or expropriation in the event of military hostilities) may 
well be considered so unlikely to be fulfilled as to render the analysis a 
purely academic exercise. 
However, even if the study is judged to have little or no practical import 
with reference to strategic stockpile policy per se, it may yet have 
important derivative implications for comparable governmental action 
in anticipation of other types of contingencies. Specifically, if a strong, 
plausible case can be made against public vis-a-vis private action in this 
domain, in which required assumptions and institutional arrangements 
are  most unlikely to be fulfilled, then arguments in favor of private 
action in other domains will have strong prima facie validity. Thus, the 
'Stephen P. Dresch, Allocations of Fad h m a n d  Ecpondituts in a Wartima B o r n m y  and  
eDvelopment of Sfrategtc Sockpi lo  Objectivas: Assessment and RuJormulafion (Rnal Report 
to  the Federal Preparedness Agency by the Institute for Demographic and Economic Studies, 
September 1879). 
study may have greater  relevance to more general issues of anticipatory 
governmental action than with reference to the specific issues of stra- 
tegic stockpiles. 
Notwithstanding the  foregoing, however, the paper is intended to provide 
a serious analysis of and recommendations concerning U.S. strategic 
stockpile policy. 
Stephen P. Dresch 
An earlier study of U.S. strategic stockpile policy (referenced in the Pre- 
face) was undertaken a t  the request and with the support of the  U.S. 
Federal Preparedness Agency (now Federal Emergency Management 
Administration) to  the Institute for Demographic and Economic Studies 
(Contract No. FPA-77-21). Critical reactions to this earlier work of 
Edward Zabrowski, Douglas Scott and Paul Kruger, all of FPA/FEMA, and 
of W. Allen Wallis (former chancellor of the University of Rochester; 
currently Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, U.S. Department of 
State), Milton Friedman (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and 
Peace), Julian Simon (University of Maryland and Heritage Foundation), 
Wassily Leontief and Faye Duchin (both of the Institute of Economic 
Analysis, New York University), and Adair L. Waldenberg (Institute for 
Demographic and Economic Studies and Northwestern University) contri- 
buted significantly to  the formulation of the analysis presented here. 
Wilhelm Krelle and John Tilton, of IIASG provided invaluable comments 
and criticisms of an earlier draft of the  present paper. None of these 
individuals, of course, is responsible ei ther  for the more formal aspects 
of the  analysis or  for the  necessarily highly subjective substantive judge- 
ments which are  expressed. 
S. P. D. 
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PRECIS 
Commenting editorially ("Remember Strategic Minerals?" February 17, 
1982), The New York lZmes advocated development of a strategic 
minerals policy based upon "a close anaiysis, mineral by mineral, of the 
consequences of import dependence and the practical alternatives," con- 
cluding with three "principles" on which, 7he Times argued, such a pol- 
icy should be based: 
[I] Stockpiles should come first ... 
[z] Private solutions are preferable ... 
[3] Keep planning flexible. 
A reasonable analysis of the issue suggests, however, that  only the  
second principle is necessary. Reliance on private (market) solutions 
could result, under achievable circumstances, in a t  least approximately 
optimal stockpiles of strategic minerals and would insure flexible adapta- 
tions of these stockpiles to evolving technologies and patterns of 
minerals availability. Moreover, de facto assignment of responsibility for 
strategic minerals availability to private investors would have potentially 
important (and beneficial) foreign and defense policy implications. The 
purpose of this paper is to  defend these assertions. That defense is 
briefly summarized here.' 
Superficially, a federal strategic stockpile seems to  make substan- 
tial sense. If defense-related contingencies giving rise to shortages of 
particular materials can be anticipated, why should the  government not 
take action in advance to reduce these potential shortages? However, 
there are two Eundarnental reasons for responding to  this question in the  
' ~ v e n  in this rather lengthy summary it is possible, at most, only to allude to the many sig- 
nificant required assumptions and qualifications of the analysis. Thus, many of the objec 
tions which can be anticipated to the arguments advanced in this overview are at least dip 
cussed, if not overcome, in the body of the paper. 
negative: 
(1) Unless federal stockpile holdings are excessively large, they will 
have little o r  no effect on aggregate (public and private) inventories 
of strategic minerals. 
(2) If federal inventory holdings are sufficiently large as  to have an 
effect on aggregate inventories, they will not  only result in levels of 
cost which are socially unjustified but may also increase the likeli- 
hood of international conflict. 
Consider a situation in which the federal government maintains no 
stockpile of strategic minerals. This does not imply tha t  there will be n o  
inventories of these minerals. Rather, private speculators will invest in 
strategic minerals, balancing the  substantial profits which will accrue in 
the (relatively unlikely) event of military mobilization (resulting in a 
rise in prices due to exceptional increases in demand or  reductions in 
supply) against the more modest losses (interest and storage costs, phy- 
sical deterioration) which will be incurred in the  (more likely) event that  
hostilities do not occur (and, hence, that  future prices are relatively 
lower than in the event of h o ~ t i l i t i e s ) . ~  Private speculative investment 
will continue until the  second just cancels (is equal to) the first. In gen- 
eral, private speculative investment will be greater  (a) the greater the 
military requirements for the various minerals and (b) the  higher the 
perceived probability tha t  hostilities will occur and that supplies will be 
disrupted; conversely, speculative holdings will be lower the higher the 
costs (especially the higher the real interest costs) entailed by mainte- 
nance of the inventory. 
The configuration of strategic minerals inventories which would be 
voluntarily chosen by private speculators will be optimal from a social 
perspective if the following conditions are met: (1) Speculators must 
correctly perceive the probability of hostilities and the effects of hostili- 
ties on demands for and supplies of the various minerals. (2) Inventory 
costs (including interest, or  discount, rates and required risk premia) 
confronting private speculators must  be no higher than those confront- 
ing the government. Within relatively narrow bounds the required condi- 
tions can be expected to be fulfilled. Thus, the  inventory holdings of 
private speculators would approximate those which would be chosen by 
an omniscient stockpile czar, probably as closely as would the holdings 
selected by a less than omniscient stockpile bureaucracy. 
If this is true, then what will be the effect of a decision to  create a 
governmental strategic stockpile? If private speculators are  aware of the 
government's action, as  inevitably they will be, then increases in govern- 
mental inventories will be offset to a greater or lesser extent by 
*As wi l l  be discussed, a critical assumption here is that private speculators do not anticipate 
that government will confiscate strategic materials inventories (or, equivalently, impose 
price controls and mandatory rationing, in the event of hostilities. Any intervention of 
government into the  functioning of private markets, current or prospective, may seriously 
undermine the argument developed here, that  the private speculative solution to the p rob  
lem of determining inventories of strategic materials will be, ceteris paribus,  socially o p  
timsl. 
reductions in private holdings, simply because the existence of govern- 
mental holdings will reduce the minerals prices which speculators 
expect to confront in the event of hostilities. 
The extent to which increased governmental holdings will be can- 
celled by reduced private holdings will depend upon, first, the impor- 
tance of defense-related contingencies as determinants of private inven- 
tories, and second, the expectations of speculators concerning the cir- 
cumstances under which the government will release its stockpile hold- 
ings to producers. If military contingencies represent a minor motiva- 
tion for private speculative investment in a particular mineral (by com- 
parison to other anticipated sources of shoi-tage, e.g., embargos, strikes, 
natural calamities), and if speculators are confident that the govern- 
ment will release its holdings to the market only in the event of military 
hostilities, then governmental inventory investments will have relatively 
little impact on private holdings. 
Unfortunately, with reference to the prospective effectiveness of 
public stockpile policy, military demands represent in excess of twenty 
percent of total utilization of many strategic minerals, and military con- 
tingencies must constitute an important motive for private as well as 
public speculative investment. Moreover, the federal government's 
repeated recourse to the strategic stockpile in the face of shortages 
unrelated to military contingencies has served to  reduce even those 
speculative private investments motivated by nonmilitary contingencies. 
Thus, the existence of governmental strategic stockpiles must imply 
lower p;ivate holdings of the same minerals than would be observed in 
the absence of the public strategic stockpile. Only when governmental 
holdings become so large as to  have eliminated military contingencies 
(and any other circumstances under which the government would 
release stockpiles to the market) as a motivation for private inventory 
investment will a given increment in governmental holdings represent 
an equal increment in aggregate national inventories, public and private. 
Beyond that point, however. increased strategic minerals inven- 
tories have adverse consequences for foreign and defense policies. Any 
foreign policy entails some risk of military confrontation or war. The 
choice of a policy is to at least some extent a function of its costs, costs 
which include, among other elements, the costs of a potential conflict 
and of the  economic dislocations which i t  would entail. If these costs can 
be camouflaged and apparently (but not in reality) reduced by exces- 
sively large strategic stockpile inventories,' then the adoption of policies 
with excessively high probabilities of eventuating in hostilities will be 
encouraged. The situation is distinct but not dissimilar in its effects to 
that which would be observed if a monopolist were in control of private 
inventories: He can draw upon future conflict-conditional speculative 
profits in order to raise the likelihood that conflict will in fact occur, 
e.g., by fanning popular sentiment against a potential adversary or by 
S ~ s  argument Bssurnes that there is an element of "temporal illusion" in social percep 
t ims of the costs of governmental policy, i.e., that small costs distributed over time are pol- 
itically acceptable while the equivalent (in present value) concentrated at  a point in time 
would not be acceptable. 
creating hostile incidents. In t h e  present case the  bureaucratic 
interests of the military and strategic stockpile authorities (and possibly 
of foreign policy authorities) may be jointly served by pursuing foreign- 
cum-defense policies which necessitate excessive stockpiles and  by purs- 
ing stockpile policies which reduce the  apparent costs of particularly 
provocative foreign-cum-defense policies. 
In short,  the optimal strategic stockpile is not independent of t he  
optimal foreign and defense policies. A stockpile policy which leads t o  
excessive inventories can  be the  cause as  well a s  the consequence of 
foreign and defense policies which entail excessively high probabilities of 
conflict. Only if stockpile inventories a re  accumulated by (private) par- 
t ies who believe tha t  they have n o  effect on the  probability of conflict 
will t he  optimal stockpile be accumulated, while the  optimal foreign and  
defense policies will be adopted only if policy makers believe tha t  they  
have no control over stockpiles of strategic minerals other than through 
their  influence (through their  foreign and defense policies) on inventory 
investors' perceptions of the  probability of conflict and the  consequences 
of conflict for minerals markets. With governmental stockpiling the  
incentives of the stockpile, foreign policy and defense policy authorities 
to  accumulate excessive inventories and  to  engage in  excessively provo- 
cative policies will be mutually reinforcing. Only with private specula- 
tion can optimal inventories and  foreign-cum-defense policies be antici- 
pated. 
Two particularly obvious and  possibly highly significant objections t o  
a policy of reliance on private speculation for the maintenance of stra- 
tegic minerals inventories require consideration. First, if speculators 
fear t ha t  their  inventories will be expropriated (with compensation a t  
preconflict prices) or  subjected to  price controls and  rationing in  the  
event of a military contingency, then their  motivation for holding these 
inventories will be destroyed. This is a fully justified concern, implying 
tha t  a decision to  rely on private speculation must  be conjoined with 
inviolable guarantees t ha t  strategic inventories will not  be expropriated 
or  subjected to price controls and  rationing.4 Since the government will 
(virtually) always be able to  bid these mineral inventories away from 
other  would-be purchasers, such  guarantees will not reduce the  
government's command over strategic minerals. In the  event of conflict 
the  prices paid by government will be higher, but  the government will 
not  have incurred the  prior costs of accumulating and  maintaining stra- 
tegic inventories. 
4tn principle, explicit Constitutional provisions would appear to offer a mechanism for such 
guarantees, in ozplicifLy constitutional political systems. However, in a parliamentary 
democracy without a written constitution, such as the United Kingdom, in which the actions 
of one session of Parliament cannot constrain the actions of another, or, to a lesser extent, 
in a system such as that of the Federal Republic of Germany, in which the Constitution itself 
places constraints on the capacity of one legislative session to preempt the powers of anoth- 
er, explicit constitutional protections of speculative investors may be foreclosed. And, even 
when constitutional protections can be provided, a constitutional provision may itself be ei- 
ther altered or ignored. l l u s ,  one can legitimately question whether there exist any cir- 
cumstances under which investors could plausibly be expected to believe that an entity with 
the inherent powers of the state would eschew intervention into private murkets were such 
intervention perceived to be in the interest of the state. 
The second objection is that,  in the event of hostilities and in the 
absence of expropriation or price controls and rationing, tremendous 
"windfall gains" will inure to  the  benefit of private speculators and that  
this would represent an undesirable redistribution of wealth. In the 
short run  this may very well appear to be true. In the (admittedly v e r y )  
long run,  however, the substantial speculative profits which would be 
realized in the  event of conflict will be eroded, in fact, cancelled, by the 
succession of losses which would be incurred in the absence of hostili- 
ties. Thus, issues of income and wealth distribution have no legitimate 
relevance to  decisions concerning the  assignment of responsibility for 
strategic minerals i n v e n t ~ r i e s . ~  Nonetheless, conventional  percept ions  of 
the income- and wealth-distributional implications OF reliance on freely- 
functioning private speculative markets may render this policy infeasi- 
ble, especially in times of war, when some classes of individuals (e.g., 
military personnel) personally bear especially high costs (even including 
death) while others (speculators) become (even temporarily) wealthy.' 
Military mobilization or war would inevitably lead to  the appearance 
of shortages of many minerals. However, a serious analysis of the prob- 
lem suggests that these shortages are unlikely to be reduced by a 
governmentally-owned strategic stockpile. The interests of society, with 
reference to both economic preparedness and to the conduct of foreign 
and defense policy, would be better served by reliance on private specu- 
lative investment for the  maintenance of stockpiles of strategic 
minerals. In short, and recalling the previously cited New York rimes 
editorial, a s  a matter  of government policy and (unless you are  a private 
speculator) nongovernmental concern, f o ~ g e t  s t ra teg ic  minera l s .  
5~lear ly ,  to impose a windfall profits or other tax on hostility-contingent speculative profits 
would vitiate the motives for strategic minerals investment. Even a conventional income 
tax will result in suboptimal strategic minerals inventories unless (1) the tax is imposed at  
a flat rate (i.e., is not progressive) and (2) inventory losses in periods of peace are fully 
deductible (i.e., result in negative tax liabilities). 
' ~ o t e  that this is an czpprrtsnf but not a r e d  moral or ethical argument against reliance on 
a private speculative solution. Lf the private speculative market were to function aa out- 
lined in this paper, then to profit from investment in strategic materials would not differ, 
on moral or ethical grounds, from profiting, in either peace or war, from the production of 
or investment in any other type of commodity or productive capacity. 
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US. SI'RATEGIC STOCKPILE POLI(=r: 
A CRITICAL A S S E S S N T  OF ANTICIPATORY 
G O v E m N T A L  ACCION 
Stephen P. Dresch 
1. Future Cont ingencies  and Anticipatory Governmental  Act ion  
While the future is necessarily uncertain,  it is not entirely unkmown: 
Contingent on certain eventualities (s ta tes  of the world), specific conse- 
quences can be anticipated. A significant fraction of governmental 
action is concerned precisely with mitigation of the  more adverse pros- 
pective consequences of uncertain but conceivable events. Superficially, 
such anticipatory governmental action appears to  be quite defensible. 
When particular exigencies can be anticipated, a failure of government 
to  pursue anticipatory policies is commonly perceived to  be irresponsi- 
ble. 
If responsibility i s  a t t r ibuted to  governments for the  consequences 
of events the occurrence (and frequently even the magnitude of the  
adverse impacts) of which cannot be influenced by governments (e.g.. 
floods, earthquakes, other "acts of ~ o d " ) , '  this attribution of govern- 
mental responsibility is especially common with reference to  those 
events t he  occurrence of which is t he  result, directly or  indirectly, of 
governmental action. Thus, for example, foreign policies which a re  a t  
least perceived to contribute to  the likelihood of embargoes or  other 
foreclosures of access to imported materials lead almost inevitably (if. 
occasionally. belatedly) to governmental actions to mitigate the  conse- 
quences of supply contractions. In this context, i t  is perhaps not 
surprising tha t  governmental responsibility is effectively assumed with 
reference t o  t he  potential consequences of military or defense-related 
contingencies, a domain in which, within any society, government is 
recognized to have a nominal monopoly of rights of action. 
Whatever t h e  factors, governmental or  nongovernmental, which a re  
believed t o  influence events, the fundamental issue from a social per- 
spective concerns t he  optimality of anticipatory action. In general, 
responsibility for anticipatory action is uncritically at t r ibuted t o  govern- 
ment  in  response t o  what is uncritically asserted to be prima facie evi- 
dence of t h e  inadequacy and nonoptimality of anticipatory nongovern- 
mental action. However, even in many (perhaps most) cases in which 
the nonoptimality of nongovernmental action can  be demonstrated, tha t  
nonoptimality is itself the consequence of governmental actions, often in  
quite unrelated domains. Moreover, t he  failure to consider the underly- 
ing sources of the  nonoptimality of nongovernmental action is frequently 
'~vidence of this perceived "responsibility" of governments is provided by the refusal of 
many regimes either to admit the occurrence of adverse events or to publically recognize 
the magnitude of the adverse consequences. It is apparently believed that to do so would be 
construed by the public as  an admission of the failure of the regime or, even, of the social- 
political system itself. 
conjoined with a failure t o  consider the  nongovernmental consequences 
of anticipatory governmental action. Thus, the unwarranted predisposi- 
tion toward governmental responsibility is generally reinforced by policy 
assessments which a r e  vitiated by several particularly crit ical but gen- 
erally unstated assumptions, specifically. tha t  anticipatory governmen- 
tal action 
(1) has no  impact per se on the probability that  t h e  anticipated event 
will occur; 2 
(2) does not  a l ter  unexpectedly t h e  anticipatory actions undertaken by 
nongovernmental parties (and/or that  nongovernmental parties do 
not engage in anticipatory action); and 
(3) does not  influence "eventuality-conditional" behavior in such  a way 
as to negate the  achievement of the objectives of anticipatory pol- 
icy. 
Unfortunately, in a number  of highly diverse domains of anticipatory 
governmental action, ranging from flood control and  catastrophe 
insurance to transportation policy and strategic stockpiles, a t  least  one 
and  frequently all th ree  of these assumptions are  violated. As a result, 
suboptimal public policies a r e  virtually assured. 
2 ~ t  might be objected that an important, perhaps primary purpose of a strategic stockpile is 
precisely to reduce the probability of prospective hostilities, simply by demonstrating to a 
potential adversary one's own preparedness. However, this objective can be achieved, argu- 
ably more efficiently, viu current investments in military preparedness per se or, if more 
appropriate, through explicit commitments to future investments in military capabilities, 
relying on private markets to achieve optimal inventories of necessary inputs (conditional 
on correct forecasts of the spectrum of possible future governmental demands). Sirr~ilar ar- 
guments can be made, even more easily, with reference to other motivations for anticipate 
ry governmental action. 
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the probable nonop- 
timality of anticipatory public policy in the  specific case of strategic 
stockpile policies developed in response to the economic dislocations 
expected to  be observed in the  event of military hostilities. If such an 
argument can be plausibly made in the military domain, in which the the  
consequences of error would conventionally be viewed as most serious 
and with reference to which the primacy of government as a locus of 
decision is commonly accepted as unarguable, then a general stance in 
favor of private vir-a-vis governmental responsibility for anticipatory 
action can be argued to be virtually irrebuttable. 
2. Contemporary U.S. Strategic Stockpile Policy: A Descriptive Overview 
Notwithstanding significant "advance mobilization" after 1938, directed 
toward meeting the military demands of Britain, in particular, and of her  
allies, U.S. entry into World War I1 in late 1941 was accompanied by the  
appearance of substantial perceived "shortages" of primary and fabri- 
cated materials required for the war effort. Largely because of this 
experience, since the  war the  federal government has continuously 
maintained stockpiles of critical ("strategic") materials anticipated to  
be in short  supply in the event of military mobilization. 
As the  agency charged with direct responsibility for the conduct of 
strategic stockpile activities, the Federal Emergency Management 
Administration (formerly the  Federal Preparedness Agency) over the past 
decade has progressively elaborated the  procedures utilized to deter- 
mine strategic stockpile "objectives" or "goals," i.e., to establish the 
target level and composition of stockpile holdings. Building upon the 
historical (and unchanged) definition of the stockpile objective as the 
"gap" between anticipated wartime requirements for and availabilities of 
a given strategic material, the projections of requirements have been 
significantly refined, taking into account such factors as 
(1) the  precise characteristics of the military hostilities in which it  is 
anticipated that  the nation may be i n v o l ~ e d ; ~  
(2) changes in the composition of final demand. reflecting both 
enlarged military demands and also civilian austerity (reflected 
especially in reductions in personal consumption expenditure for 
durables and in residential construction); 
(3) prioritization of final demands (distinguishing between defense, 
essential civilian and general civilian expenditures, in that  
hierarchical order), conjoined with an associated concept of "tiered 
risk" (with a lesser loss or cost attached to  shortfalls of require- 
ments  from availabilities in the  case of lower-priority expenditure 
categories); 
(4) reliability ranking of potential sources of supply (foreign and domes- 
tic), considering political orientations, vulnerability to disruption of 
production facilities and transportation systems, etc., with differen- 
tial degrees of reliability of supply required for the various priority 
categories of final demand; and 
3h practice, this is achieved by arbitrarily assuming a war of a specified duration (three 
years), with a specified number of fronts (two). In principle, however, each hostility confi- 
guration should be considered, in conjunction with i ts  associated probability of occurrence. 
On this basis, am "expected" gap between requirements and availabilities, corlstituting the 
strategic stockpile objective, could be determined. As will be discussed, this discrepancy 
between practice and principle is simply one instance of a general class of inadequacies as- 
sociated with current policy. 
(5) specification of differential degrees of anticipated feasible substitu- 
tion of nonshortage for shortage materials (again related to  the 
priority ranking of t he  expenditure category). 
Superficially, these relatively elaborate and  apparently sophisticated 
procedures for determining stockpile objectives represent a substantial 
improvement over the simple fixed-coefficients estimates of shortfalls of 
aggregate "availabilities" from aggregate "requirements" previously 
employed, permitting a much  more sensitive adjustment of stockpile 
holdings to  evolving economic, technological and security conditions and 
considerations than  could heretofore be achieved. Whether this is in  fact 
the case, however, will depend on a number of factors, especially includ- 
ing 
(1) t h e  statistical reliability of the highly disaggregated quantitative 
data  required for empirical implementation of this more sophisti- 
cated approach; 
(2) t h e  correspondence between the  behavioral assumptions implicit in  
t he  approach and the  economic behavior which would actually be 
observed in t he  event of military mobilization; and 
(3) t he  absence of premobilization reactions t o  strategic stockpile accu- 
mulations which offset or negate t he  objectives of stockpile policy. 
Each of these is a crit ical prerequisite for the effectiveness of cur ren t  
\ procedures, and with reference to each serious questions can be raised. 
Data requirements  for the  more disaggregated approach will rise 
rapidly, roughly by a t  least the  square of the  degree of a t tempted 
disaggregation. In l ight of the  costs of acquiring detailed economic and 
technological data and of the  likelihood of decreasing statistical reliabil- 
ity a t  more disaggregated levels, the benefits of greater disaggregation 
and refinement may be more apparent than real, falling significantly 
short of the costs involved. Various techniques by which to reduce data 
requirements may, of course, be employed, such as deriving coefficients 
for a disaggregated sector from a more basic set of coefficients a t  an 
aggregated sectoral level. If bases for making such adjustments are rea- 
sonably firm, the results may significantly improve on the conclusions 
that would be reached a t  the more aggregated level. However, in prac- 
tice this approach may result in conclusions which differ only trivially 
(and not significantly) from those tha t  would be reached on the basis of a 
less apparently refined analysis. In this event, the benefits of more 
refined procedures will be ephemeral. On the other hand, if the conclu- 
sions are found to differ substantially, i t  is important both to determine 
the source of the differences and to  verify their validity and reliability. 
In general, the  procedures by which stockpile objectives are deter- 
mined do not rest upon explicitly stated and justified behavioral- 
economic and p u b l i ~ - p o l i ~ ~  stipulations and assumptions. Thus. changes 
in economic behavior, e.g., the "austerity reduction" in durable con- 
sumption expenditure and in residential construction, are stipulated, 
but the mechanisms by which these changes are induced are not identi- 
fied. Unless economic behavior in the event of military mobilization 
corresponds to that  assumed in the formulation of stockpile objectives, 
the level and composition of the stockpile may have little relationship to 
the patterns and magnitudes of the material shortages which in fact 
emerge as a consequence of the final demands which are actually 
observed. 
Premobilization reactions to the level and ra te  of investment i n  the  
strategic stockpile a r e  entirely ignored in the  cu r r en t  approach t o  the  
formulation of stockpile objectives. However, if nongovernmental inven- 
tory investment behavior is significantly influenced by governmental 
stockpile actions, t hen  the  ne t  augmentation of economic capabilities 
associated with the  strategic stockpile may fall short  of tha t  augmenta- 
tion superficially implied by t h e  gross level of stockpile holdings. In fact. 
as  will be demonstrated, there  a r e  substantial reasons to  believe tha t  
nongovernmental inventory holdings of strategic materials will respond 
to  governmental holdings. First, if governmental stockpile acquisitions 
lead to  current-period increases in  prices of these materials (absolutely 
or relative to  expected fu ture  prices), then this will imply reductions in  
desired private holdings of the same materials. Second. the anticipation 
of future flows from the  strategic stockpile, by increasing expected 
future availabilities and  reducing expected future prices, will also serve 
t o  reduce desired private inventory holdings. 
A detailed critique of contemporary U.S. strategic stockpile policy, 
however, requires t ha t  t he  economic context of strategic stockpile 
activity be articulated, capturing (a) those aspects of private economic 
behavior which would be influenced by governmental stockpile accumu- 
lations and  dispositions a n d  (b) t he  internal dynamics of governmental 
policy. 
3. Determinants of Anticipatory Nongovernmental Action 
In broadest terms, strategic stockpiles represent inventories of materi- 
als deemed to be critical to military mobilization. Thus, the issue of the 
optimal strategic stockpile policy can be viewed as a special case of the 
more general issue of optimal inventory policy: By what criteria and on 
what basis should inventories of various materials be determined? This 
question is conventionally approached a t  the outset from the  specific 
vantage point of governmental policy, with particular attention to two 
possibly distinguishing features of the strategic stockpile: (1) its pur- 
poses and (2) its governmental ownership. Critical insight, however, may 
be facilitated by a less restrictive consideration of the strategic stockpile 
within the context of inventory theory, examining the economic role and 
determinants of strategic materials inventories, whether publically or 
privately held. 
Two functions of inventories can be identified. F'irst, inventories 
may be required in order to  achieve production efficiency, broadly con- 
ceived If a marginal increment to  inventories reduces production costs 
(through economies of scale in purchasing or shipping, etc.) by an 
amount greater than the  implicit interest, storage and related costs of 
the enlarged inventory, then the increment in inventory holdings is 
economically justified. 
Second, inventories may be held because of uncertainties concern- 
ing future conditions of supply, demand and, hence, prices. Directly or 
indirectly, inventory holdings (or stockpiles) motivated by uncertainty 
concerning future market conditions constitute speculative inventories. 
Speculation in this  sense can occur only in  the face of uncertainties con- 
cerning future s tates  of the  world, uncertainties which can  involve 
future conditions of demand or of supply. 
The strategic stockpile thus represents a class of speculative inven- 
tory. defined by the  types of contingencies which motivate i ts acquisi- 
tion: changes in demand or  of 'supply which a r e  contingent upon the  
occurrence of military mobilization or war. In most  general terms these 
contingencies lie along a multidimensional continuum, involving such 
factors as  the nature,  duration, extent and geographic locus of actual or 
potential hostilities. For purposes of the immediate discussion, however, 
this continuum can  be reduced to two states  of the  world, characterized 
as  "peace" and "war." 
If war were a purely probabilistic event, then a private speculator 
would approach the  issue of strategic stockpile or inventory investments 
as  follows: Supply a n d  demand for each future period would be predicted, 
conditional on the  two alternative possible s ta tes  of the world, peace and 
war. If supply were expected to be reduced and/or demand were 
expected to be increased in the event of war, then  prices would be 
expected to be higher in the  event of war t han  of peace. If inventories 
were accumulated in periods of peace, t hen  they  could be sold in  periods 
of war a t  prices above peace-time purchase prices. Speculative profits 
would then equal sales revenues less purchase costs and carrying 
charges (interest,  storage fees, physical deterioration, obsolescence, 
etc.). For any given probability of war, there  would then be a n  inventory 
(strategic stockpile), the  ezpected economic profit on the marginal (and, 
assuming perfect competition, average) uni t  of which would equal zero. 
With freedom of entry into all markets  (on the part  of actual or  potential 
speculators), this would represent t h e  competitive, profit-maximizing 
level of stockpile inventories. 
Although, in principle, the problem is amenable to solution, the ana- 
l y t i c ~  of competitive, profit-maximizing private stockpile investment 
become quite complex in the multiperiod or  infinite-time-horizon case. 
However, the essential characteristics of t he  solution can  be meaning- 
fully indicated by a simplified two-period model. Period 0, assumed to be 
one of peace, is characterized by the current-period supply and  demand 
curves for commodity X (exclusive of n e t  speculative inventory 
demands) depicted in Figure 1 by 4 and  S. Period 1 supply is also 
assumed, for simplicity, to be represented by the curve S, regardless of 
the s ta te  of the  world (peace versus war). Period 1 demand, however, is 
represented a s  contingent on the s ta te  of the world, Dp in the event of 
peace and  D, in  the event of war. Any strategic inventory accumulated 
in period 0 is assumed to  be sold in period 1 regardless of the  s tate  of t he  
world which actually eventuates. Increasing speculative inventory 
demands will raise the  period 0 price and lower the  period 1 price, 
whether war occurs in period 1 or not. Assuming zero inventory carrying 
costs o ther  than  interest  a t  the ra te  r ,  private stockpiles will be accumu- 
lated until  the condition is fulfilled tha t  
where Z is the probability tha t  a s ta te  of war will exist in period 1, 
(1-Z) is the probability of peace in period 1, 
& is  aggregate inventory investment, 
Po(&) is price in period 0, a function of 4, 
Figure 1. Determinants of Competitive Private Stockpile Investment 
P1,,(&) is the war-conditional price in period 1. 
P19(&) is the peace-conditional price in period 1, and 
T is the interest rate.  
The prices Po, P1,, and P19 will be functions of period 0 stockpile inven- 
tory investment (period 1 stockpile inventory disinvestment), A ,  with 
the precise functions determined by the  parameters  of the cu r r en t  
period demand and supply functions, Dp, Dw and S. Thus, equation 1 can  
be solved for the competitive profit-maximizing level of stockpile invest- 
ment ,  &, a t  which expected economic profits would equal zero. 
Ignoring transactions a t  disequilibrium prices (or, assuming tha t  a 
process of Walrasian tantonnement Edgeworthian recontracting contin- 
ues  until  all markets clear, with no  transactions a t  disequilibrium 
prices),4 then  a t  the final solution a period 0 contract  for for fu ture  
delivery (and payment) in period 1 will involve a predetermined price 
which will just equal (a) the  cu r r en t  (spot) period 0 price plus interest  
and  (b) t he  expected period 1 price. Thus, competitive private specula- 
tive investments will insure effective equality between cur ren t  spot 
prices and futures prices. Although exchange a t  disequilibrium prices 
may qualify this conclusion, t h e  general tendency will be toward 
interest-rate-adjusted equality between all prices.5 
4The assumption of a process of tantonnoment  or "recontracting," thus precluding the o c  
currence of disequilibrium transactions, insures that the e z  d o  and e t  post equilibria will 
be identical. Otherwise, disequilibrium transactions, through their influence on the distri- 
bution of wealth, could have the effect of zltering the equilibrium. The alternative solution 
to  this problem is Marshall's asumption of the constancy of the marginal utility of money 
(as reflected in his development of the pure theory of exchange, with reference to the "corn 
market"). See: Leon Walras, Eldments d'dconomie politzque pure ( N o r i a  do La Tichussu su- 
c i a i s )  [1874-71, 5th edition (Paris and Lausanne, 1926); Francis Ysidro Edgeworth, Mathumat- 
ud h c h u s  (1881); and Alfred Marshall, A n c i p l e s  of Etonomics [1890], 4th edition (Lon- 
don, 1888). 
5This conclusion is, in fact, a specific instance of the general requirement (the "Hotelling" 
It  must be stressed that  this solution assumes that  stockpiles 
(inventories) are accumulated by competitive private speculators and 
that both producers and consumers of commodity X are  perfectly com- 
petitive. If, in contrast, stockpiles are accumulated only by a monopolis- 
tic private speculator (or by a cartel), then the monopolist's (cartel's) 
investment in inventories, A*, , would be determined so as to  maximize 
the present value of expected profits, E(IT), where 
6 and it  will always be t rue  that  &., < &. Thus, monopoly in speculative 
markets will inevitably lead to  underinvestment in stockpiles from a 
social perspective. because. as will be indicated below, the level of com- 
petitive private stockpile investment will represent a lower bound on the 
socially optimal stockpile.? 
Although this discussion of private stockpile behavior has been cast 
in partial equilibrium terms, clearly the actual process of competitive 
private stockpile investment must  be conceived in a general equilibrium 
or "emmetropic" rule) that, in intertemporal equilibrium, prices of resources (nonproduced 
materials) and of speculatively-inventoried materials generally must rise a t  the real rate of 
interest. See H. Hotelling, "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources," J o u d  o f  Pbliticd 
B o n o m y  (1931), and S .  P. Dresch, "Myopia, Emmetropia or Hypermetropia? Competitive 
Markets and Intertemporal Efficiency in the Utilization of Exhaustible Resources," aASA 
Working A r p e r  WF84-48 (June 1984). 
 quati ti on 1 can be viewed as  a special case of equation 2, with the maximization of equation 
2 (the monopoly equation) replaced by the imposition of the zerc-profit condition of equa- 
tion l. 
'The conclusion that the  monopolist's stockpile investment will always be less than the 
competitive inventory investment, and hence less than the socially-optimal inventory, a s  
sumes that the probabilities associated with the future states of the world (peace Venus 
war) are given and not subject to influence by the monopolist. V, in fact, the monopolist 
can, a t  a cost, influence the probability of war, then i t  is conceivable that the level of invest- 
ment which maximizes monopoly profits will exceed the competitive level of inventory in- 
vestment. Also, this monopoly investment and also the monopolistically-influenced proba- 
bility of war will both exceed the social optima. A parallel case will be discovered with referc 
ence to public stockpile investments. 
framework, recognizing the  full range of direct and derived demands and 
their  interrelationships, including substitution possibilities in produc- 
tion and in end  use. However, because the important aspects of the  
problem can be more easily identified in partial equilibrium terms,  the  
discussion here  can be conducted within this frame of reference. 
4. Governmental Influences on and Social Optimality of Anticipatory 
Nongovernmental Action 
The essential issue to be addressed here  concerns the conditions under 
which the  process of competitive private stockpile investment will lead 
to socially optimal inventories of strategic materials. In the  absence of 
externalities,' this question can be reduced to one of (a)  divergences of 
private inventory investment behavior from tha t  stipulated in the  uncon- 
s t rained competitive model and (b) possible discrepancies between the  
marke t  (private) and  governmental (social) perceptions of the  critical 
factors influencing private inventory investment. 
4.1. Actual versus Idealized Private Inventory Determination Behavior 
In general, apart  from monopoly influences (and possibly even including 
these),' actual private inventory behavior will diverge from tha t  implied 
by the idealized competitive model primarily as  a resul t  of governmental 
'~xternalities here refer t o  effects which cannot be internalized in governmental final 
demands for goods and services. Because those externalities which can be internalized 
through governmental final demands will be reflected in market demands for strategic ma- 
terials, these do not introduce discrepancies between the competitive private and socially 
optimal stockpile inventories. 
'kionopoly influences need not be excluded if the sustained presence of monopoly elements 
i s  itself due to public policy, as could be argued to be generally the case. In essence, I would 
argue that  the poTsistonco of any monopoly (or of u. collusive oligopoly or cartel) requires a t  
least t he  de facto support of government. 
intrusions into the market. In the context of strategic s tocb i l e  policy 
three important classes of intrusions can be identified. First, govern- 
mental intrusion into market functioning, in the event of military or 
other contingencies, may undermine the  motivations of private specula- 
tors to accumulate inventories which would otherwise be privately (and, 
as will be discussed, potentially socially) optimal. Second, general 
governmental policies, e.g., tax policies, may have seriously distorting 
effects. Flnally, governmental stockpile policies, possibly motivated by 
the deficiencies of private investment resulting from the foregoing 
governmental influences, may well further vitiate private stockpile 
investment activity. 
Perhaps the most serious source of private market failure with 
reference to inventories of strategic materials is the prospect of govern- 
mental intrusion into market functioning in the event of military (and 
possibly other) contingencies. The most obvious and likely of these 
intrusions involves expropriation of private inventories (with compensa- 
tion at premobilization prices) and/or imposition of price controls (with 
attendant rationing) in response to  the "shortages" which materialize as 
a result of military mobilization.1° The expectation of either expropria- 
tion or price controls and rationing will undermine the incentives of 
private speculators to accumulate strategic inventories. 
'hie expropriation nppears to differ from imposition of price controls and rationing, this 
difference is only apparent. In essence, these represent identical public policy actions. In 
the case of expropriation, the government commandeers the available stock, providing such 
compensation of prior owners as i t  deems fit, and then directly allocates that stock to alter- 
native uses (and users). The some result can be achieved by f i ~ n g  prices (at  the desired 
compensatory levels) and then achieving the desired allocations via rationing. Thus, 
although the mechanisms are slightly different, the end result is effectively the same. In 
both cases there is an excess demand a t  prevailing (governmentally determined) prices, 
w i t h  the actual allocation of the scarce supply determined not by the market but rather by 
governmental decree. 
Superficially, expropriation or  price controls and rationing appear 
to be necessary in order  to assure adequate governmental command 
over scarce s t rategic  mater ial  in the event of military hostilities. HOW- 
ever, because the  government presumably could outbid other  prospec- 
tive purchasers of s t rategic  materials in t he  event of war, even if i t  were 
forced to  acquire these materials on free and open markets," t h e  
optimal governmental policy, if fear of expropriation or price controls 
and rationing is a source oE private market failure, is to certify nonin- 
terference with normal marke t  functioning, even in t he  event of war. 
Such a certification of governmental noninterference in  the  func- 
tioning of Eree private markets,  even under conditions of military crisis 
and mobilization, will have the  desired effect only if i t  is credible t o  
actual and potential inventory investors, i.e., only if i t  is believed. 
Clearly, this requires substantially more than a simple s tatement  of 
"policy" (e.g., an  Executive Order of the President) on the part  of t h e  
government. Such a s ta tement  will lack credibility because investors 
can anticipate circumstances under  which the  government may change 
(leading to a concomitant change in price policy), while even in t h e  
absence of a political change a governmental policy may be altered in  
'The one possibjy significant exception to this statement involves demands of the military 
opponent which might be satisfied, directly or indirectly, on domestic markets. This possi- 
bility exists because, if optimal strategic inventories are to be accumulated, private specu- 
lators should be free t o  engage in transactions on world markets, both prior to and in the  
event of military conflict. However, even this exception may be argued to be more apparent 
than real, in that the foreign and defense policies of the various countries should take into 
account the resources which a potential adversary would choose to devote to a military con- 
frontation. More generally, even in the case of military opponents there exist "gains from 
trade," a s  reflected, e.g., in differential demands for strategic materials, exploitation of 
whch should benefit both parties. Ln other words, if the opponent values a given flow of ma- 
terial at  a higher rate than does the own country, then the own country can profit from ex- 
change. Of course, the relative valuations should include consideration of the consequences 
of the trade for probabilities of military victory and defeat. 
response to changed circumstances. While i t  is probably not possible to 
consider any constraint  on any governmental ent i ty  to be strictly inviol- 
able, specific devices in certain institutional contexts may offer substan- 
tial real andpe rcewed  protection to investors. 
With reference t o  U.S. governmental insti tutions and history, it can 
be argued tha t  a prohibition against market interference which takes the 
form of a Constitutiond guarantee of nonintervention will impose sub- 
stantially grea te r  constraints on governmental action than would, e.g., 
an executive order  or  a statutory provision. Clearly, as the  history of the 
Civil W a r  (and subsequent wars) will indicate, even Constitutional con- 
s t raints  have been significantly loosened in periods of national crisis. 
However, even in these cases t he  existence of Constitutional prohibitions 
has served to l imit the  degree of eztraConstitutiona1 action on the  part  
of government, and  in most cases even these more limited ezh-aconsti- 
tutional actions were eventually censured, with provision for a t  least 
limited compensation of victims (although in many cases, e.g., the 
internment  of citizens of Japanese ancestry during World War 11, the 
compensation was seriously delayed and was significantly less in present 
value than  the  costs incurred). 
Even if an effective guarantee of nonintervention could be devised, 
i t  might be argued t h a t  expropriation or price controls a re  necessitated 
not by t h e  need t o  insure governmental command over scarce resources 
but  in order to  prevent the income and wealth redistributions t o  which 
private speculation would give rise in event of war. Thus, for example, if 
the probability of war were very low, then the level of competitive inven- 
tories of s t rategic  materials would, ceteris paribus, be correspondingly 
low; the very low probability of a large speculative gain in the  event of 
war, due to the small size of the strategic inventories, would be just 
offset by the high probability of a succession of small losses on these 
small inventories should war not occur (as is likely). However, if war did 
indeed occur, then the large gain, regardless of how unlikely, would actu- 
ally be realized, implying possibly major redistributions of income and 
wealth. 
In fact, on average and over very long periods of t ime such infre- 
quent large gains would be fully offset by frequent small losses. Of 
course, over the short and intermediate runs, these war-conditional 
redistributions might be quite substantial. And while arguably not unac- 
ceptable in their own right, their political implications in a period of 
national emergency might be seriously deleterious, simply due to the 
rnisperception of the  source of these gains (and of corresponding, peace- 
conditional losses) on the part of the  populace. However, as will be dis- 
cussed subsequently, to at tempt to  mitigate o r  offset these redistribu- 
tions through, e.g., the imposition of high rates of taxation on specula- 
tive profits, by reducing the rate of return to inventory investment, 
would itself vitiate the  motive for private stockpile accurnulations.12 
Thus, political considerations may virtually force what are effectively 
confiscatory rates of taxation. despite the fact that  these undermine the 
''This would be the case unlem (a) taxes on strategic inventory profits (and losses) are 
levied at a flat rate, (b) private inventory investments are entirely debt financed (in which 
case all inventory costs are fully deductible for tar  purposes), (c) private inventory invest- 
ments generate, in the long term. zero economic profits (expected net losses in periods of 
peace just equal, in present value, expected net profits in periods of war), and (d) private in- 
ventory losses in periods of peace lead to immediately rebateable negative tax liabilities. If 
these conditions are fulfilled, the inventory-profits tar  will simply amount to governmental 
sharing in both the profits and losses of private stockpile investors, with the governmental 
share of losses just offsetting the governmental share of gains. 
efficiency of private inventory investment. 13 
As noted, more general  public policies may have similarly deleteri- 
ous consequences for t h e  performance of private speculative markets. 
While the effects of taxes specifically targeted on "windfall gains" of 
private speculators in  periods of military mobilization would be espe- 
cially adverse, even genera l  income taxes, by driving a wedge between 
interest ra tes  and r a t e s  of re turn  to  stockpile investment, would have 
the  consequence of reducing levels of strategic inventories below their 
socially optimal levels. Thus, taxes, and especially income taxes, 
represent the most seriously intrusive element of public policy influenc- 
ing private inventory investment.  
In this regard, however, i t  is important to note tha t  t h e  effects of 
tax policy for s t rategic  inventory investment are qualitatively no dif- 
ferent than  the effects for other categories of investment. Thus, stra- 
tegic inventories cannot  be assumed to be more suboptimal than, e.g., 
investment in other  inventories or in physical plant and equipment. 
Moreover, to the degree t o  which these nonoptimally depressive effects 
of tax policy a re  compensated by other policy instruments (e.g., invest- 
men t  tax credits), t he re  may  be no ne t  adverse consequences for rates  of 
investment, including s t rategic  inventory investments (assuming tha t  
these are also eligible for  favorable compensatory treatment).  
'hie the imposition of nonneutral taxes on speculative inventory profits may undermine 
the efficiency of domestic speculative markets, this need not imply that world speculative 
markets will be inefficient. Thus, if the dome-c component of these ~narkets is sufficiently 
small, exclusion of domestic speculators may have little consequence for the social optimal- 
ity of global speculative activity. The key issue is the optimality of inventory supplies to 
which the nation has access in thc event of hostilities, not the national identities of the le- 
gal owners of these, as long es access itself can be assured. 
Apart from tax policy, other general governmental policies also 
influence inventory (including strategic stockpile) investments. In par- 
ticular. tariffs, import quotas and other intrusions into international 
trade may significantly reduce inventories of primary materials for 
which foreign sources enjoy a comparative advantage. Conversely, subsi- 
dies to producers will inflate domestic supplies, thus lowering net-of- 
subsidy prices, currently and (through induced expansions of capacity) 
in the future. Whether this will induce increases in inventory levels will 
depend upon the  relative reduction in present by comparison to 
expected future prices. Regardless of the consequences of subsidies to  
domestic producers for strategic inventories, however, these subsidies 
can be argued to be inefficient in their own right. 
A plethora of other policies altering business costs (e.g., intrusions 
into financial markets which serve to influence interest rates) or  con- 
straining market functioning (e.g., insurance and securities regulation) 
will exert lesser, but possibly nontrivial, impacts on strategic materials 
inventory investments. Directly and indirectly serious consequences 
may flow from governmental policies which permit or even foster collu- 
sion among actual and potential inventory investors. since monopolistic 
elements in speculative markets will (a) reduce inventory investments, 
ceter is  paribus, below what will be argued to be their socially optimal lev- 
els and (b) stimulate possibly effective attempts to raise the probability 
that  a military contingency will in fact occur, thus raising expected 
monopoly profits. With reference especially to  monopolistic cartelliza- 
tion but also to  other constraints on market functioning, the  persistence 
of these over time (i.e., into the  "intermediate" term) almost inevitably 
requires governmental acquiescence if not active governmental assis- 
tance, even if the origins are  nongovernmental. 
Finally, active governmental involvement in strategic stockpile 
accumulation will have severe consequences for the  social efficiency of 
private inventory investment behavior. One of the most important impli- 
cations of the simplified competitive inventory investment model 
developed in the preceding section is  that,  if private stockpile invest- 
ments  motivated by the anticipation of war are  determined as indicated, 
then any attempt by the state (government) t o  augment private inven- 
tories by the accumulation of public stockpiles will be frustrated as a 
result of concomitant reductions in private inventories. This will result 
because previously marginal private investments will become unprofit- 
able; the public stockpile reduces expected future prices relative to  
current  prices, but only if the  ratios of future to present prices are  
restored to their prior (pre-public-stockpile) levels will inventories be 
profitable (zero economic profit) for private investors. Thus, an 
announced intention of the  state  to release any given flow of material 
from the public stockpile in the  event of war will correspondingly reduce 
the  intended flows from private inventories. 
In short, if the sole motivation for private inventories of strategic 
materials is the expectation of prospective military contingencies, then 
the accumulation of a public strategic stockpile will induce what can be 
anticipated to  be precisely offsetting reductions in private inventories. 
This process will continue until the  public stockpile has become so large 
as to reduce private inventory investments to zero. Only beyond that  
point will an increment in public stockpile holdings constitute a 
corresponding increment  in total national inventories. 
The foregoing mus t  be qualified somewhat when private speculative 
inventory holdings a re  motivated by the anticipation of contingencies 
other than war (or military contingencies more generally). Thus, to  the 
degree to  which private speculators, a t  the margin, determine inventory 
holdings in response t6 such nonmilitary contingencies as, e-g., adverse 
weather conditions, strikes or political events, private speculative invest- 
ments  will be relatively unaffected by the  existence of a public stockpile 
as long as speculators do not  anticipate losses in t he  event of military 
contingencies (resulting, e.g., from expropriation) and do anticipate t ha t  
recourse will be made  to  t h e  public stockpile only in the event of mili- 
t a ry  contingencies. Conversely, were the public stockpile viewed as  a 
general market-stabilizing device, from which the government would sell 
under any circumstances in which prices were believed to  be above 
long-run equilibrium levels, then the  public and private stockpiles would 
again become close substitutes,  while the anticipation of expropriation 
in the event of hostilities would lead military contingencies to  en ter  
negatively into the  determination of speculative inventories motivated 
(positively) by nonmilitary contingencies. 
In fact, if private stockpiling is motivated entirely by contingencies 
unrelated to war o r  military hostilities, and if private speculators antici- 
pate the release of public stockpiles only in the  event of war, t hen  the 
existence of public stockpiles may actually induce i n c r e a s e s  in private 
inventory investments.  This paradoxical result could occur  if private 
speculators viewed the  existence of the public stockpile a s  significantly 
reducing the likelihood of governmental interference with t h e  marke t  
allocation of resources in the event  of war. Anticipation of, e-g., 
expropriation or price controls and  rationing in the  event of a military 
contingency could, as noted, reduce inventories desired in anticipation 
of nonmilitary contingencies, while t he  existence of the public stockpile 
could possibly insulate these non-war-related inventories from uncer- 
tainties associated with the possibility of war. This positive effect of a 
public stockpile would be greater  t he  higher the perceived probability of 
a military contingency. Apart f rom this  "special case," however, public 
and  private speculative inventory investments,  t o  a greater  or lesser 
extent, appear as  substitutes. 
4.2. Systematic Discrepancies between Private and Social Perceptions of 
the Determinants of Strategic Inventory Investment 
If, apart  from the foregoing class of divergences of actual from 
hypothesized private stockpile investment  determination, t he  specula- 
tive private market  functions a s  outlined, this leaves only one class of 
potential discrepancies between socially optimal and privately elected 
levels of strategic inventory investment.  This relates t o  systematic 
differences between "true" and privately-perceived values of the vari- 
ables determining ra tes  of inventory investment. On the basis of the  
foregoing analysis five key determinants  of competitive private inven- 
tory investments can be identified. Specifically, t he  competitive private 
stockpile will vary, ce te r i s  paribus, 
(a) directly with 
(i) the  probability of war, 2, and 
(ii) the degree of war-induced demand and/or supply shift, and 
(b) inversely with 
(iii) the base- and  Future-period elasticities of demand and of supply 
(war- and  peace-conditional). 
(iv) t he  interest  rate,  and  
(v) other  inventory costs (storage charges, physical deterioration, 
etc.). 
If perceptions of these factors by governmental authorities and by 
private speculators are identical, then the optimal stockpile from the 
vantage point of t h e  s tate  is identical to tha t  which would be determined 
by a freely-functioning private, competitive market ,  insulated from 
governmental interference. 
Of t he  foregoing determinants of competitive private stockpile 
investment,  the last ,  noninterest inventory costs, would not be expected 
to lead to  significant discrepancies between optimal public and private 
stockpile inventories, i.e., there is little or no reason to  believe tha t  
social and  private costs, o r  perceptions of these, would differ systemati- 
cally. With reference to  t he  other four, however, private speculative per- 
ceptions and  "true" social values might well differ significantly, imply- 
ing seriously nonoptimal (in general, suboptimal) levels of strategic 
inventories. This i s  especially likely with reference both to the supply- 
demand related variables and also to the probability of a military con- 
tingency, because strategic considerations may lead to  significant 
efforts on the  part  of governments to  mislead systematically potential 
opponents and  also, by default, potential speculators, t hus  magnifying 
any independent sources of private speculative error.  Finally. a s  a resul t  
of capital (and possibly insurance) market  imperfections, significant 
discrepancies may be observed between private and social discount 
(interest) rates.  
Of these determinants of competitive private stockpile investments,  
the war-conditional demand and  supply shifts a r e  likely to be most  criti- 
cal; any divergence of private expectations from t rue  values will have 
probably severe consequences, manifested in  serious discrepancies 
between the privately-elected and  socially-optimal level of strategic 
materials inventories. Moreover, misperceptions of war-conditional 
demand and supply shifts are  likely to be closely related t o  (and gen- 
erally indistinguishable from)l4 misperceptions of elasticities of demand 
and  supply, i.e., a high elasticity of demand, ce ter is  paribus, is likely t o  
imply the existence of close substitutes,  with the consequence tha t  war- 
induced shiRs in functional requirements will be distributed over 
demands for a number  of highly substitutable commodities, implying a 
relatively modest demand shift, while a low elasticity of demand will sug- 
gest the absence of close substitutes and thus the  likelihood of signifi- 
can t  war-conditional demand shifts (unless, in ei ther  case. t h e  material  
in question is not required. directly or indirectly, as  a significant input 
in to military capabilities). 
14~ernand (supply) shifts and elasticity differentials will be operationally equivalent in the  
sense that  any given war- versus peace-conditional price differential observed under a re- 
gime of competitive private stockpile investment could be generated by a virtually infinite 
number of combinations of (a) demand (supply) function shifts and (3 )  elasticities of 
demand (supply), with reductions in elasticities compensating for rt:ductiox in the magni- 
tude of functional shift. Thus, in their effects these factors are equivalent. 
Discrepancies between "true" war-conditional developments and 
perceptions of these on the  part of private speculators concerning war- 
conditional supply and (especially) demand shifts a re  particularly likely. 
simply because differences between war-time and peace-time demands 
for and supplies of strategic materials are likely to be due primarily to  
directly conflict-related military demands and supply disruptions. If full 
information concerning war-conditional military demand and supply 
prospects were available to private speculators, then (assuming public 
and private coincidence with reference to all other relevant factors) 
optimal public and private stockpiles (inventories) would coincide. How- 
ever, strategic considerations may lead to restrictions on the dissemina- 
tion of information concerning war-contingent supplies and military 
demands for specific materials. To the  degree to which such information 
is classified, withheld from private speculators, governmental predic- 
tions of war-conditional market conditions. e.g., military demands, may 
be very different from. and in general significantly "tighter" (as exem- 
plified by higher demands, lower supplies, and hence higher prices) than, 
private speculative predictions. In short, private speculators would be 
especially likely to  fail to anticipate particular, secret uses of specific 
materials and probable unavailability of particular sources of supply. 
In this situation the government is confronted by a difficult 
dilemma. Specifically. it can either (a) reveal to  private speculators 
classified information the secrecy of which is deemed to  confer strategic 
military advantages or (b) attempt to compensate for nonoptimally small 
private inventories by accumulating a public stockpile. In the first case, 
it will inevitably reveal strategic information not only to private 
speculators but also to potential adversaries. But, i f  the  government 
elects to accumulate a publically-owned stockpile, it will risk (a) 
indirectly revealing, through its stockpile purchases, information which 
i t  had wanted to remain secret, or, if secrecy concerning prospective 
military demands is maintained, (b) inducing offsetting reductions in  
private inventories. In order both to maintain secrecy and to avoid erod- 
ing private inventories, t he  government might at tempt to  conduct i ts 
stockpile acquisition activities (purchases) themselves in secrecy. How- 
ever, in the  event of significant stockpile demands on materials markets,  
secrecy may well be impossible to  maintain. Hence the dilemma of 
governmental intervention to accommodate systematic discrepancies 
between t rue  and speculatively anticipated war-conditional demands for 
strategic materials. 
While there may be no easy resolution of this dilemma, i t  is likely 
that  i t  is more apparent than real. Especially in light of contemporary 
intelligence capabilities, i t  is probable tha t  a t tempts  a t  secrecy will be 
more successful vis-a-vis actual and potential speculators than  vis-a-vis 
actual and potential military adversaries. Thus, a policy of full disclo- 
sure of information concerning prospective war-conditional materials 
demands would be unlikely in fact to  confer strategic advantages on 
prospective adversaries, while i t  would permit private speculators, 
ceteris  paribus, t o  accumulate socially-optimal inventories of strategic 
materials. 
The possibility of systematic private speculative error  in the estima- 
tion of t he  probability that  a military contingency will occur raises 
issues virtually identical to those confronted with reference to private 
misconceptions of war-conditional military demands for strategic 
materials. If assessments of speculators are  significantly above or  below 
the true probability of war, then private strategic inventories will be 
excessively large or  small, respectively. If all information relevant to 
the assessment of the probability of war were in the public domain, then 
there would be no reason a e o r i  to believe tha t  a discrepancy between 
governmental and private perceptions of this probability would be attri-  
butable to "private error," but full information may well not be avail- 
able, simply because diplomatic and strategic considerations may lead to  
restrictions on the  full disclosure to private speculators (and to adver- 
saries) of information relevant to the assessment of the  probability of 
war. In this event market-determined private inventories of strategic 
materials may well diverge significantly from the social optimum. Again, 
however. i t  is likely tha t  restrictions on the availability of information 
are more effective vis-a-vis prospective market participants than pros- 
pective opponents. Thus, a policy of full disclosure can be argued to be 
the appropriate response to private speculative error. 
Especially with reference to the probability tha t  a military con- 
tingency will occur, given full disclosure by the government of all infor- 
mation relevant to  the assessment it  is not clear a priori that  any 
discrepancy between governmental and private estimates of the proba- 
bility will reflect a private error. That is, the true probability of war may 
be miscalculated by the government as well as by private speculators. In 
the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, there would appear 
to be no reason to  embrace such a discrepancy as indicative of market 
failure. 
The issue of "moral hazard" inevitably arises in connection with the  
anticipated probability of war or  other  military contingency. Specifi- 
cally, given any level of stockpile inventories, an  increase in the  proba- 
bility of war will increase the  value of stockpile holdings, as reflected in 
capital gains t o  inventory owners. As long a s  stockpile speculation is 
competitive, there  is no incentive for the  individual speculator t o  act,  
alone or in concert  with other  speculators, to  bring about an increase in 
t he  probability of war. However, a monopolistic speculator (or specula- 
tive cartel)  will increase his expected profits if he  can ac t  to  raise the  
probability of war. Thus, in any case in which speculative markets a r e  
noncompetitive, t he  probability of war itself may be manipulated to  
enhance expected speculative profits. 
In general,  however, t he re  is no reason to  anticipate the presence of 
significant noncompetitive elements in  strategic material inventory 
markets.  In t he  absence of governmental restrictions, barriers to  en t ry  
would be expected t o  be slight or nonexistent. Economies of scale, which 
a re  generally identified as sources of concentration, would be especially 
unlikely, since physical storage represents the  only real cur ren t  
economic activity. Finally, commodity markets a r e  sufficiently highly 
developed t o  encourage recur ren t  entry into and exit from these mark- 
ets. Thus, the  reasonable presumption is t h a t  these markets will exhibit 
relatively high degrees of competition. 
The problem of moral hazard en ters  in a particularly complex 
manner  when government itself acts  a s  t he  stockpile inventory investor, 
especially in  cases in which ei ther  private speculative stockpile inven- 
tories a re  fully displaced through substitution of public for private 
holdings or in which the operation of the private speculative market is 
vitiated by the threat  of governmental expropriation or price controls 
and rationing. With government as the sole strategic stockpile invest- 
ment agent, the very existence of the stockpile may act to  increase the  
probability of war, especially if the size of the stockpile is excessive vis- 
a-wis the social optimum (determined by the true e z  a n t e  probability of 
war, i.e., that  probability which would be observed were responsibility for 
strategic inventory investment vested in an efficiently functioning 
private speculative market). Because the excessive size of stockpile 
inventories reduces the  dislocations which would be encountered in the  
event of war, the willingness of government to pursue policies which 
raise the likelihood of war may be increased. 
Conversely, from a game-theoretic point of view the excessive size 
of the governmentally-owned stockpile may reduce the willingness of 
potential adversaries to  initiate or enter into hostilities, since the proba- 
bility of victory/defeat will depend upon the resources (including stra- 
tegic inventories) available to the contending parties. Whether this 
effect will fully (or more than fully) offset the proconflict influences of a 
more confrontational foreign policy is. of course, uncertain. Thus, i t  is 
difficult to determine, e z  a n t e ,  even the direction of the effects of the  
size of the strategic stockpile on the probability of war. However, i t  can  
be noted that,  whatever the beneficial effects of excessive stockpiles on 
the behavior of potential adversaries, these effects could be more effi- 
ciently achieved by a policy of announced governmental commitment to 
the maintenance of military capabilities, in times of both peace and war. 
With reference to the potential implications of the size of the stra- 
tegic stockpile for the probability of victory or defeat in the  event of hos- 
tilities, the question of whether these implications should not be expli- 
citly considered in the determination of the  socially optimal strategic 
stockpile arises. However, given the economic resources available to the 
nation in current and future periods, the desire to avoid defeat or to 
achieve victory will be reflected in the peace- and war-conditional mili- 
tary demands for resources and hence are already taken into account, 
implicitly, in the determination of the optimal competitive private (and 
social) strategic stockpile inventory. One possible exception, related to 
externalities associated with private nonmilitary demands and resource 
utilization in the event of war, is discussed below. 
Returning to the  prospect of moral hazard and of prospectively 
excessive strategic inventories when inventory accumulation is the pro- 
vince of a governmental monopoly, the situation is probably worse than 
that  which would be anticipated in the event of private monopoly 
because of the bureaucratic incentives confronting the various involved 
governmental authorities and of the interactions between these authori- 
ties. If each group, e.g., stockpile authorities, military authorities and 
foreign policy authorities, attempts to maximize its budget and influ- 
ence, subject to constraints, then actions of each become mutually rein- 
forcing. An excessive stockpile loosens the  constraints (anticipated 
dislocations) associated with prospective conflict, permitting foreign pol- 
icies exhibiting higher risks of military confrontation, while these risks 
necessitate greater military preparedness, etc.  
This situation would not be cause for serious concern if each of the 
relevant parties were acting independently and if the action of each were 
socially optimal, conditional on the actions of the others. However, i t  is 
clearly the case that  stockpile authorities will have every incentive 
(enhancement of bureau size, budget, etc.) to accumulate stockpiles 
which exceed the  social optimum, that  similar incentives will confront 
defense and foreign policy officials, and that collusion between defense, 
foreign policy and stockpile bureaucracies will permit joint maxirniza- 
tion at what may be especially pronounced social suboptima (as exempli- 
fied, in this case, by excessively high strategic inventories, inflated mili- 
tary capabilities, and confrontational foreign policies). 
In short, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for socially 
optimal stockpile, foreign policy and military decisions is that  decisions 
in each domain be made by effectively independent parties, with each 
party's decisions conditional only on knowledge of the decisions made in 
the other domains and of the relationship of these "other-party" deci- 
sions to  "own" decisions. This is clearly more likely, in the case of stra- 
tegic stockpile decisions, if decisionmaking responsibility is decentral- 
ized and privatized, especially since the allocation of responsibility to 
private markets can be argued to result in an at  least approximately 
socially optimal strategic inventory configuration. 
Returning to  the key determinants of strategic material inventories, 
the final dimension in which there may be a significant discrepancy 
between private and social (true) values of a relevant variable involves 
the discount or interest rate. To the degree to  which the effective 
interest rates  confronted by private speculators, inclusive of rnarket- 
determined risk premia, exceed the  social discount ra te ,  profit- 
maximizing private stockpile inventories will fall short  of t h e  social 
optimum. As in the  case of general income taxes, however, this will be 
t rue  of the  relationship between actual and optimal investments of all 
types, strategic inventory and other;  similarly, to  t h e  degree to  which 
these discrepancies between private and social discount ra tes  a r e  com- 
pensated by appropriate public policies, e.g., investment tax  credits, 
then conditions for optimality of private inventory accumulation will 
have been restored. In short,  this  discrepancy implies e i ther  a general 
problem related to  t he  optimality of all investment or  will have been 
appropriately compensated by o ther  means. 
I t  might be thought t h a t  the risks associated with private strategic 
inventory investments, e.g., the risks of unanticipated price changes and 
especially the "risk" t ha t  war (and consequent price increases) will not 
occur, would be reflected in  substantial  risk premia incorporated in  
interest ra tes  confronting private strategic inventory speculators. How- 
ever, in principle, and  t o  a significant degree in fact, this  risk can  be 
both shifted to  those most willing t o  bear i t  (to the most  risk neutral,  or, 
less plausibly, risk seeking) and also pooled across contingencies (reduc- 
ing the magnitude of the variance of expected returns,  t he  principle 
measure of risk), and hence would not be expected to be reflected signifi- 
cantly in  the interest  rate confronting private speculators. Of course, 
unless this risk (variance in expected returns)  can be reduced to zero or 
the  residual risk can  be shifted to  risk neutral  market  participants, the  
residual risk will have a t  least some depressive effect on private stra- 
tegic inventory investments. However, if t he  residual risk is small, then 
the replacement of profit maximization by utility maximization on the 
part of private investors, due to the presence of risk aversion, should 
have only minor consequences for levels of strategic inventories. More- 
over, the depressive effects of risk aversion on strategic inventory 
investments should be no greater than the depressive effects of risk 
aversion on other  classes of investment. 
In short, the risks associated with strategic inventory investments 
are of an inherently insurable variety, implying that  these can be both 
reduced by pooling and shifted to the  most risk neutral of potential 
market participants, As a result, approximately optimal private stockpile 
investments will equate the preset values of expected prices (net of 
noninterest inventory costs) in all future periods, with the interest rate  
entering into the discounting of expected future prices incorporating 
only a minor component related to risk (variance in returns) while the 
probability of war (and other factors influencing the  mean and variance 
of expected ~ r i c e s )  will enter  primarily through their  influence on mean 
prices expected in any future period. 
The judgement implicit in the  foregoing, that ,  subject to various 
qualifications, competitively determined private stockpile investments 
will be socially optimal, assumes that no externalities are associated 
with the private pattern of final demand as determined, whether in peace 
or war, subject to the market  interactions of demand (as augmented by 
competitively-de termined private stockpile investment) and supply (as 
augmented by competitively-determined private st,ockpile disinvest- 
ment). This may not, however, be the case. 
Private consumption of certain commodities the  demands for which 
are highly elastic with respect to either price or total consumption may 
decline significantly in response to the civilian austerity imposed in time 
of war and to price increases associated with shortages even when these 
are conjoined with optimal private stockpile accumulations. While these 
declines would represent utility-maximizing private responses to  war- 
induced changes in relative prices and rates of consumption, because of 
potential negative externalities associated with reduced consumption 
certain specific changes in consump.tion might have seriously n o n o p  
timal social consequences, as. e.g., if tire purchases fell, due to high 
prices, to  a point that  t ire failures led to  a significant rise in auto-related 
mortality and injury. Even here, however, other governmental policies 
would more efficiently respond to these externalities. Thus, for example, 
in the case of nonoptimally low private demands for tires, efficient liabil- 
i ty rules would serve either to stimulate war-contingent demands for 
tires, hence increasing the  level of the  competitive private stockpile, or 
to reduce driving in a period of war. Thus, i t  is difficult to imagine 
specific cases in which adjustments of private demand to war-time 
austerities would be necessarily undesirable, assuming optimality of 
other, related public-cum-private policies. However. a t  least the possibil- 
i ty of negative externalities should be entertained, providing a potential 
source of divergence of the competitive private stockpile from the  
socially-optimal level of strategic inventory investments. 
4.3. Private Strategic Inventory Investment and Social Optimality: A 
Reprise 
In summary, competitive private investments in strategic material 
inventories would be determined with reference to (a) the probability of 
war in each future period, (b) anticipated peace- and  war-conditional 
configurations of demand and supply for all materials, taking into 
account both anticipated war-conditional shifts from civilian to  military 
final demand, as induced by t ax  and expenditure policies anticipated in  
the  event of war, and also substitution possibilities in production and  end 
use, (c) the  interest costs of inventory investment, and  (d) o ther  costs 
associated with strategic inventory holdings (storage, deterioration, 
etc.). The socially optimal stockpile investment will differ from competi- 
tive private investments in  strategic inventories only i f  private 
perceptions-cum-expectations of these differ systematically from t rue  
social values and/or if significant externalities a re  associated with 
private war-conditional rates of utilization of strategic materials. 
Even if competitive private stockpile investments and  stocks would 
be, in t h e  absence of constraint, socially optimal, the  functioning of the 
competitive private inventory market  may be seriously impaired if 
private speculators anticipate the  expropriation of scarce supplies (or 
other interferences with private market allocations, e.g., imposition of 
price controls and concomitant rationing) in the event of a military con- 
tingency. Considerations of short- or intermediate-term changes in the 
distribution of income or wealth may encourage direct (expropriation, 
price controls and rationing) or indirect (income. profits, windfall profits 
tax) governmental intrusion into private strategic inventory markets, 
notwithstanding the  fact tha t ,  on average and over the very long run ,  
private strategic material  speculation will not generate  excessive profits; 
a s  a result ,  the government may not  find i t  politically feasible or desir- 
able to provide the guarantees  of marke t  nonintervention which would be 
required if private strategic stockpile investment were to  be encouraged. 
even if the level of private investment which would result  were judged to  
be socially optimal. 
5. Contemporary U.S. Strategic Stockpile Policy: A Critique 
The general conclusion of the foregoing analysis is that ,  in general, the  
level and  configuration of strategic inventories which would be elected 
by a n  efficiently functioning private speculative marke t  would also be 
socially optimal (subject t o  cer tain exceptions and  qualifications, excep- 
t ions and qualifications which could be accommodated by policies other 
than  governmental intrusion into strategic inventory accumulation). 
Thus, t he  objective of governmental stockpile policy, for whatever rea- 
sons it is undertaken, should be to simulate as  closely a s  possible what 
would otherwise be the  private competitive outcome. However, it will 
not, in general, be possible for government simply to en ter  into the stra- 
tegic materials marke t  solely to  augment what a r e  perceived to  be 
nonoptimally small private inventory holdings, simply because the  
governmental a t tempt  t o  augment  strategic inventories will induce 
offsetting changes in private inventory holdings. 
The most serious failure of contemporary procedures for the formu- 
lation of U.S. strategic stockpile policy is that these procedures totally 
ignore pre- and post-mobilization reactions of private inventory behavior 
to  governmental intervention. Premobilization reactions will be espe- 
cially important,  in tha t  governmental intrusion will (a) immediately 
al ter  cur ren t  materials prices and (b) will alter expected future prices a s  
a resul t  of flows from governmental inventories. 
Of these premobilization reactions, the  first effect (i.e., t h e  
response t o  rises in current-period prices) will be observed in any period 
in  which ne t  additions are  made to  the strategic stockpile, if the short-  
r u n  elasticities of supply a re  less than infinite.15 In contrast,  the  second 
effect (i.e., t he  response to  anticipations of future price reductions 
resulting from future flows from the  stockpile) will be observed even in 
periods in which no ne t  additions to the strategic stockpile a re  under- 
taken. 
The potential negative private effects of net  additions to  the s t ra-  
tegic stockpile raise questions concerning optimal strategies of stockpile 
acquisition, involving such issues a s  the relative degree of reliance t o  be 
placed on spot markets,  futures  markets and long-term supply contracts.  
etc. For example, if supply is highly price-inelastic in the short r u n  and  
if expectations of future prices a r e  highly correlated with current  prices, 
then  governmental entry into spot markets when demand is low, by 
maintaining levels of cur ren t  (and hence of expected future) prices, may 
l%le the  primary response to  price increases resulting from stockpile acquisitions will be 
exerted in  the period of the acquisition, lesser effects will also be exerted in other periods, 
due to the intertemporal shift of private purchases in response to the price increases 
resulting from stockpile investments. 
result in relatively little depression in private inventory demands. Simi- 
larly, if long-run supply is highly elastic while short-run supply is inelas- 
tic, a strategy of stockpile accumulation that  relies heavily on long-term 
supply contracts or futures markets will minimize the effect of strategic 
stockpile accumulations on private markets. Although the serious 
analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of the present paper, i t  is 
important to note that  they are subsidiary to and virtually independent 
of the more basic issues raised by the  second class of premobilization 
reactions, induced by expectations concerning n e t  withdrawals from 
(rather than additions to) the strategic stockpile. 
The magnitude of the response to the anticipation of lower future 
prices associated with prospective stockpile outflows will depend upon (a) 
private motives for inventory accumulation and (b) private expectations 
concerning the circumstances under which net  outflows from the stra- 
tegic stockpile will be made by the Federal government. If, at the mar- 
gin, private inventory holdings are determined entirely by considera- 
tions unrelated to  expectations concerning future military mobilization 
and its economic consequences, and if ne t  withdrawals from the stra- 
tegic stockpile are  anticipated only in the  event of military mobilization. 
then the  existence of the strategic stockpile will have little or no influ- 
ence on the level and composition of private holdings of strategic 
materials. If,  however, either of these conditions is not met, then the 
very existence of the strategic stockpile will induce offsetting reductions 
in private holdings, reductions potentially equal in magnitude to the 
strategic stockpile holdings. 
This possibility, of partially or fully offsetting reductions in private 
inventory holdings as public holdings are increased calls into question 
the very rationale for the establishment of a publically-owned strategic 
stockpile. The critical issues here involve private expectations and 
motivations, neither of which is even considered in the current formula- 
tion of strategic stockpile objectives. Current policy seems implicitly to  
assume that  military considerations and the anticipation of military 
mobilization are of no importance in the determination of private inven- 
tories of strategic materials and that private parties anticipate flows 
from the strategic stockpile only in the event of military hostilities and 
mobilization. 
With reference to many materials widely used in the civilian econ- 
omy, the first of these implicit assumptions, that  private holdings are  
not motivated by military considerations, may be justified. However, 
with reference to materials predominantly used in military production, 
this assumption is probably quite unrealistic. In this case, as has been 
discussed, if the governmental objective is to bring about inventories of 
strategic materials greater than would be held voluntarily by private 
investors, then i t  will be necessary for the  government to totally displace 
the private sector, acting effectively as the sole holder of strategic 
inventories. This suggests a distinction not currently made in the  for- 
mulation of strategic stockpile objectives, between those materials the 
private holdings of which are determined primarily without regard to 
anticipated military demands and those for which military demands 
represent the predominant motivation for both public and private inven- 
tory holdings. Very different approaches to the formulation of strategic 
stockpile policy and objectives will be appropriate in these alternative 
cases. 
Even if private holdings a r e  determined primarily without regard to  
prospective future military demands, any private expectation tha t  flows 
from the strategic stockpile will be utilized to augment  availabilities 
under circumstances not  related t o  military mobilization will result  in 
reductions in desired private inventory holdings. Thus, if i t  is antici- 
pated tha t  the strategic stockpile will be utilized to  stabilize marke ts  
even in the  absence of military mobilization, then the  existence of t he  
stockpile will reduce desired private holdings. In this connection, i t  c an  
be strongly argued tha t  t he  effectiveness of t he  strategic stockpile with 
reference to its primary function, the  augmentation of economic capa- 
bilities in the event of war, has  been significantly eroded over t he  
postwar period, as  repeated recourse has been made to  strategic stock- 
piles for purposes of general marke t  stabilization and supply augmenta- 
tion. 
Although the political pressures to utilize the strategic stockpile t o  
alleviate shortages unrelated t o  military mobilization can be well under- 
stood, the  adverse consequences of this practice can be clearly demon- 
s t rated and should be strongly argued by those authorities responsible 
for the formulation of s t rategic  stockpile policy. If i t  is determined tha t  
i t  is desirable for the federal government to intervene to stabilize mark- 
ets in the  event of instabilities not involving military mobilization, t hen  
the  conduct of this (even more  difficult) function should be totally 
separated from the formulation and  execution of strategic stockpile pol- 
icy. Unfortunately, all of the incentives confronting strategic stockpile 
authorities will be in the  direction of consolidating military and  civilian 
stockpile activities, notwithstanding the  fact t ha t  pursuit of the  second 
will inevitably imply a sacrifice of the  first. 
In short, current  s t rategic  stockpile policies res t  upon very tenuous 
foundations, with reference to  both premobilization and postmobilization 
economic behavior and consequences. To a significant extent, however, 
strategic stockpile policy may  become a selffulfilling and  selfjustifying 
prophecy precisely because of these weaknesses. Thus, if the accumula- 
tion of a federal strategic stockpile leads to  offsetting reductions in 
private inventories, the deficiencies of private inventories will constitute 
p r i m a  fac ie  (but false) evidence of the necessity for a publically-owned 
inventory of strategic materials.  Similarly, in the  event of military 
mobilization, if the level and composition of the strategic stockpile is 
known, then, on the basis of anticipated flows of material  from the  stock- 
pile, those materials of which there  a re  large stockpiles will be substi- 
tu ted  for others, creating precisely those "shortages" which a re  t hen  
"alleviated" by drawing on the  strategic stockpile. Thus, after the fact, 
it will be difficult or impossible to  determine the t rue efficacy of s t ra-  
tegic stockpile policies. In effect, cause and  effect a re  reversed: SOT- 
t u g e s  a r e  n o t  a n t i c i p a t e d  in the  f o r n u l a t i o n  of s tockpi le  o b j e c t i v e s ,  b u t  
s tockpi le  ob jec t i ves  ( t h r o u g h  t h e i r  pre -  a n d  p o s t m o b d i z a t i a n  i m p a c t s  o n  
p r i v a t e  behav ior )  give  r i s e  to  s h o r t a g e s  which the  s tockpi le  t h e n  m i t i -  
g a t e s .  
This selffulfilling-prophecy character-ization of strategic stockpile 
policy is simply an ex t reme instance of what can be argued to be a gen- 
eral  problem: Although cu r ren t  procedures for determining stockpile 
objectives assume that ,  in the event of military mobilization, the confi- 
guration of the economy (of materials requirements and availabilities) 
will be given independently of the strategic stockpile, in fact the 
existence of the stockpile will influence the configuration of the econ- 
omy. Clearly, if certain "requirements" cannot be met,  then some adap- 
tation will be made, a t  greater  or lesser cost or sacrifice of objectives, 
and these "requirements" will thus cease to be requirements. 
Correspondingly, in an environment of general shortage availabilities 
from the stockpile will either reduce resources devoted to the generation 
of supply from other  sources or will induce increased utilization 
("requirements"). 
These considerations suggest a possibly interesting and useful 
reversal of the  procedures currently employed in the  formulation of 
federal strategic stockpile policy. Rather than stipulating a configura- 
tion of the war-mobilization economy. on which basis stockpile objectives 
are determined, instead the  level and configuration of the stockpile 
could be stipulated, on which basis the resultant configuration of the 
economy would be identified, taking into account both pre- and postmo- 
bilization reactions to  the existence of the stockpile. Variations in the 
composition of the stockpile could then be translated into variations in 
the ultimate economic configuration. With this approach, the conse- 
quences of, e.g., increasing stockpile holdings of a particular material 
could be predicted, permitting a n  assessment of the  benefits, direct and 
indirect, relative to the  costs entailed. 
The point of this proposal for a reversal of current  practice is, sim- 
ply, that the purpose of the strategic stockpile is to increase economic 
capabilities in the event of military mobilization, while current pro- 
cedures assume capabilities in deriving stockpile objectives. Although 
"benefits" (gross if not net) may well be associated with increased stock- 
pile holdings, current procedures provide no basis on which to estimate 
these benefits or the associated costs. Only if the benefits and costs can 
be identified and quantified can the optimality of stockpile policy be 
assessed and desirable changes in policy be undertaken. 
The foregoing leads directly to  the fundamental issue of stockpile 
policy. The general objective in the  determination of stockpile policy 
must be to achieve an optimal (or more optimal) configuration of the 
economy in the event of military mobilization than would be achieved in 
the absence or alteration of the strategic stockpile. Although current 
procedures assume a configuration of the economy, for the realization 
of which required stockpile holdings are determined, there is no evi- 
dence tha t  this configuration is socially optimal, or  is more optimal than 
that  which would be achieved were no strategic stockpile to be main- 
tained. Until this is demonstrated, the real social benefits deriving from 
the existence of the  stockpile, if any, cannot be determined. 
6. Conclusion 
Implicitly underlying contemporary strategic stockpile policy is the 
apparent perception that  the inventories of strategic materials which 
would be held by private speculators in anticipation of war would in fact 
be nonoptimal from either a social or governmental perspective. Thus, 
either the private speculative solution must be deemed to be nonoptimal 
as a result of one or more of the  factors discussed above (e.g., systemati- 
cally biased information available to private speculators concerning 
either the probability of war or war-conditional military demands for 
strategic materials, private interest rates above the social discount rate, 
or externalities associated with private wartime utilization of scarce 
materials), governmental action necessary to permit private achieve- 
ment of socially optimal inventories (e.g., guarantees of nonintervention 
into market resource allocations even in times of military hostilities) 
must be considered politically infeasible (e.g., as a result of the short- or 
intermediate-term redistributions of income and wealth which would 
occur in the event of war), or, finally, criteria which would not be 
reflected in optimal speculative privat? investment must be deemed (by 
government) to be relevant to the determination of desirable strategic 
stockpile inventories. 
If governmental action is motivated by private speculative market 
failure resulting from either of the first two factors just indicated, then 
the appropriate objective of governmental strategic stockpile policy 
must be to  simulate the  solution which would be achieved by efficient 
private speculative markets, taking into account the probable displace- 
ment of private by public stockpile inventories. In this event, the 
evaluation of current procedures for determining governmental stra- 
tegic stockpile objectives (target inventories of all relevant materials) is 
conceptually straight-forward. First, are these strategic stockpile objec- 
tives appropriately sensitive to the various factors which would enter 
into the determination of speculative private inventory holdings'! And 
second. is the  probable displacement of private by public inventories 
adequately recognized in t he  determination of governmental stockpile 
objectives? 
The foregoing assumes tha t  the private competitive solution, with 
qualifications, would in fact represent the socially optimal investment in 
strategic inventories. The conclusion of the preceding analysis is that ,  
in welfare-economic terms,  this would indeed be the case. However, 
socially and governmentnlly optimal strategic inventory investments 
might well diverge. In consequence, even if cur ren t  procedures for 
determination of strategic stockpile objectives were found not to  con- 
form to those which would be represented in the  socially optimal private 
speculative solution, this would not constitute primn facie evidence tha t  
actual procedures a r e  inappropriate from a more narrowly governmental 
perspective. Thus, t he  evidence tha t  current  procedures are  seriously 
inadequate from a social perspective does not negate the possibility tha t  
these procedures a r e  desirable when evaluated with reference to  diver- 
gent  governmental objectives. The issue then. of course, concerns the  
legitimacy of such divergences between social and governmental 
"optimality," should they actually be found to  exist. 
Finally, even assuming a correspondence between social and  govern- 
mental objectives, the finding tha t  the criteria which would be reflected 
in the strategic inventory investments of an  efficient private speculative 
market are  not represented in the determination of governmental stock- 
pile objectives might indicate only tha t  the analytical and  computational 
demands which would actually be associated with an  at tempt  to simulate 
the private speculative solution are  simply so great  as  to render  the 
attempt infeasible or, if feasible, so costly that  the costs exceed any pos- 
sible benefits which would result from otherwise more optimal strategic 
inventory holdings. Even if this conclusion should be reached, however, 
i t  is important to consider the possible desirability of representing more 
adequately the  relevant private speculative solution criteria in more 
feasible "second-, third-, ..., nth-best" procedures for determination of 
public stockpile objectives. 
The fundamental conclusion of this analysis, however, is tha t  effec- 
tively all of the possible objections to an explicit and overt policy of reli- 
ance on private speculative markets for the determination of strategic 
materials inventories are extremely weak, resting on superficial percep- 
tions rather  than serious analysis. Moreover, even those possibly signifi- 
cant objections (e.g.. externalities associated with private material use) 
could be met  by means other than the displacement of private by public 
responsibility for strategic inventory accumulation. 
